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STATE FISH STOCKING PROGRAMS AT RISK:
TAKINGS UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
AMY L. STEIN*

“If these ‘environmentalists’ really wanted to help the poor
1
animals, they would commit suicide to leave more room.”
Anyone who yawns at the mention of “fish stocking” may be
oblivious to the fact that it can elicit such an intense response,
especially from a fisherman. Fish stocking, raising fish in a hatchery
and placing those non-native fish into a water body, has been in
2
practice for over a hundred years. The primary purposes of fish
stocking include the following: (1) mitigating declines of fish
3
populations caused by federal water projects; (2) helping to recover
4
fish species listed on the Endangered Species Act; and (3) providing
5
wildlife-oriented recreational opportunities like fishing. In the case
of U.S. Pacific salmon, “[h]atchery programs generally have two goals
which can conflict with one another: to increase the number of
salmon available for fishing, and to prevent natural salmon from
6
becoming extinct.”
While the virtues of supplementing wild populations of fish are
often extolled, scientific studies have indicated that fish stocking can

* Visiting Associate Professor of Legal Research and Writing, The George Washington
University Law School. Thanks to William Stein IV and my research assistants, Sara Vink and
Jessica Katz.
1. Ted Williams, Got Trout?, FLY ROD & REEL, Apr. 2009, at 18, available at http://
www.mylfrog.info/pdfs/FRR_gottrout.pdf.
2. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Fisheries and Habitat Conservation, http://www.fws.gov/
fisheries/fisheries.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009) (discussing how U.S. Commission of Fish and
Fisheries were charged in 1872 with “supplementing declining native stocks of coastal and lake
food fish through fish propagation.”).
3. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., National Fish Hatchery System, http://www.fws.gov/
fisheries/nfhs/ (last visited Dec 26, 2009).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 2009).

63

Stein_final_cpcxns .doc

64

2/22/2010 9:32:05 AM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

Vol. 20:63

7

harm the wild, native species of the water body. Reports have
established the propensity of hatchery fish to out-compete the native
8
fish for food sources, the frequency of hatchery fish to feed on the
9
10
native species, the transmission of disease, and the dilution of the
11
native fish gene pool through mating of the hatchery and native fish.
The National Park Service has heeded this scientific data and has
12
banned fish stocking in all of the National Parks. Yet there is a

7. See, e.g., GENE S. HELFMAN, FISH CONSERVATION: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING
RESTORING GLOBAL AQUATIC BIODIVERSITY AND FISHERY RESOURCES 422 (2007)
(citing R.R. Reisenbichler & S.P. Rubin, Genetic Changes from Artificial Propagation of Pacific
Salmon Affect the Productivity and Viability of Supplemented Populations, 56 ICES J. MARINE
SCI. 459, 459 (1999), which concludes that supplementation programs degraded wild strains and
that “artificial propagation poses a genetic threat to conservation of naturally spawning
populations”); id. at 432 (citing R.S. Waples, Dispelling Some Myths about Hatcheries, 24
FISHERIES 12 (1999), which concludes that hatcheries have many adverse effects on wild fishes);
C.
Boydston
et
al.,
Nonindigenous
Fish,
available
at
http://biology.usgs.gov/status_trends/static_content/documents/olrdocs/Nonative.pdf (examining
issues that arise with the introduction of nonindigenous fish).
8. See Robert T. Lackey, Fisheries: History, Science, and Management, in WATER
ENCYCLOPEDIA: SURFACE AND AGRICULTURAL WATER 121 (Jay H. Lehr & Jack Keely eds.,
2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/wed/pages/staff/lackey/pubs/history.pdf (“Nonindigenous species often compete with or prey upon commercially or recreationally important
fish species”).
9. See Ramon Vandern Brule & Nick Gayeski, An Overwhelming Body of Evidence: How
Hatcheries are Jeopardizing Salmon Recovery, WASH. TROUT REP., Spring 2003, available at
http://www.washingtontrout.org/Hatchery%20Article.pdf (claiming that “[b]oth predation and
displacement of wild juveniles by hatchery juveniles is occurring in rivers and estuaries
throughout the Northwest”).
10. See, e.g., Joseph Kiesecker, Fish-Stocking May Spread Amphibian Disease,
CONSERVATION MAG., Oct. 2001, available at http://www.conservationmagazine.org/articles/
v2n4/fish-stocking-may-spread-amphibian-disease/.
11. See HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, COLUMBIA RIVER HATCHERY REFORM
PROJECT, FINAL SYSTEM-WIDE REPORT, APPENDIX A.1: PREDICTED FITNESS EFFECTS OF
INTERBREEDING BETWEEN HATCHERY AND NATURAL POPULATIONS OF PACIFIC SALMON
AND STEELHEAD 2 , available at http://www.hatcheryreform.us/hrp_downloads/reports/
columbia_river/system-wide/4_appendix_a_1_interbreeding_fitness_effects.pdf (noting that
“[t]he propagation of Pacific salmon and steelhead . . . in hatcheries has raised concerns for
more than 30 years regarding the long-term genetic effects of hatchery-origin fish on the mean
fitness of natural populations”); UC DAVIS CTR. FOR WATERSHED SCIS., SALMON,
STEELHEAD, AND TROUT IN CALIFORNIA: STATUS OF AN EMBLEMATIC FAUNA 142 (2008),
available
at
http://www.caltrout.org/SOS-Californias-Native-Fish-Crisis-Final-Report.pdf
(estimating that the fitness, i.e. ability to produce young that survive to reproduce, of steelhead
decreases almost 40% per generation of hatchery culture).
12. The last hold-out was the North Cascades National Park. The National Park Service
indicated that if Congress did not explicitly authorize fish stocking in the Cascades by July 1,
2009, the practice would be banned. On June 2, 2009, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 2430, to direct the Secretary to continue fish stocking in certain North Cascades lakes, but
the Senate failed to pass the bill. See also National Parks Traveler, Stocking of Non-Native Fish
at
North
Cascades
National
Park
Comes
to
a
Halt
(July
3,
2009),
AND
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federal hatchery system designed to research and implement fish
13
stocking across the country, and fish stocking is in full force in over
14
thirty-five of the fifty U.S. states.
For many years, fish stocking has flown relatively low on the
15
legal radar screen.
But one case brought by environmental
organizations in California may change that. In 2006, the Pacific
Rivers Council and the Center for Biodiversity brought suit against
the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) under
California’s “little NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act),” the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), for failure to
16
consider the effects of fish stocking on native populations. Included
in the evidence against the state agency were expert affidavits and
reference to over 100 scientific studies attesting to the harms of trout
17
stocking on native populations. The plaintiffs specified twenty-five

http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2009/07/stocking-non-native-fish-north-cascadesnational-park-comes-halt (discussing stocking of non-native fish species in national parks).
13. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 3.
14. G. Edwards and J. Nickum, Use of Propagated Fishes in Fish and Wildlife Service
Programs 22 U.S.-JAPAN AQUACULTURE PANEL SYMP. (1993), available at
http://www.lib.noaa.gov/japan/aquaculture/report22/edwards.html; see also Fishintrips.net, Fish
Stocking Reports, available at http://www.fishintrips.net/StockReports.html.
15. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Andrus, 476 F.Supp. 966, 970 (D. Co.
1979) (Endangered Species Act suit against Utah officials for violating section 9 with fish
stocking dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); In re Operation of the Mo. River System Litig., 363
F.Supp.2d 1145, 1169, n. 13 (D. Minn. 2004) (holding for Fish and Wildlife Services and states
against section 9 Endangered Species Act suit for fish stocking where plaintiffs failed to respond
to defendants’ motions on the issue).
16. Pac. Rivers Council v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Game, No. 06 CS 01451 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov.
24, 2008).
17. Plaintiffs allege that the stocking of hatchery-reared fish significantly reduced
populations of threatened and endangered fish and amphibians; resulted in hybridization that
can permanently genetically alter or effectively eliminate populations of threatened and
endangered wild trout and salmon; introduced diseases and invasive species that adversely
affect native fauna; and negatively impacted native ecosystems and food webs. Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petitioners’ Response to Respondent’s
Motion for Modification of Judgment and Peremptory Writ at 3, Pac. Rivers Council v. Cal.
Dep’t of Fish & Game, No. 06 CS 01451 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 2008).
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fish and amphibians at risk, including sixteen endangered or
19
threatened species.
After two years of litigation, the California Superior Court
required the DFG to comply with CEQA and prepare an
20
environmental assessment. While the state prepared its assessment,
the court ordered interim measures that limit DFG’s ability to stock
fish where monitoring surveys have demonstrated the presence of
certain sensitive native aquatic and amphibian species, or where
monitoring surveys for these species have not yet been conducted—
21
approximately 175 lakes and streams in California. In early 2010,
the state issued its final environmental assessment, which assessed
impacts of the state’s fish stocking operations, as well as the hatchery
22
operations and the issuance of Private Stocking Permits.
The
environmental assessment recommends a preferred alternative of
continued fish stocking for recreational purposes with DFG
implementing guidelines that allow for some protection of native
23
species.
The environmental assessment identifies over fifty
potentially significant effects and includes mitigation measures to
24
“reduce the impacts to less than significant.” Notably, the state
acknowledged that even with the proposed actions, some impacts on
protected species, such as the “significant adverse competition,
predation, non‐target harvest, or genetic effects of current hatchery
operations” on native salmon and steelhead evolutionary significant
18. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, PACIFIC RIVERS COUNCIL AND CENTER FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRICTIONS ON STOCKING OF TROUT TO
PROTECT NATIVE FISH AND AMPHIBIANS IN CALIFORNIA WATERS (2008), available at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/fishstocking_reform/pdfs/PRC+CBD_statement_on_fish-stocking_agreement.pdf
(discussing
scientific studies of species affected by trout stocking).
19. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species Listed in California Based on Published Population
Data, available at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/stateListingIndividual.jsp?state=CA
&status=listed.
20. California Department of Fish and Game, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Draft
Hatchery and Stocking Program Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact
Statement
Executive
Summary
2
(September
2009),
available
at
http://
www.dfg.ca.gov/news/pubnotice/hatchery/.
21. Id.
22. California Department of Fish and Game, DFG Hatchery Operations Environmental
Impact
Report
(EIR)/Environmental
Impact
Statement
(EIS),
available
at
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/news/pubnotice/hatchery/.
23. California Department of Fish and Game, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Final
Hatchery and Stocking Program Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact
Statement ES-11 (January 2010), available at http://www.dfg.ca.gov/news/pubnotice/hatchery/.
24. Id. tbl.ES-2 and ES-12 (potentially significant impacts include competition and
predation by stocked trout and salmon, genetic effects, and distribution of invasive species).
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units and native steelhead distinct population segments cannot be
25
reduced to “less-than-significant levels.”
While this case may lead to similar lawsuits brought against other
26
states with “little NEPAs,” state fish stocking programs may also be
27
attacked using the stronger federal Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Section 9 of the ESA subjects any person to liability for “taking” a
protected species where an action results in direct or indirect harm to
28
a protected species or its habitat. Whereas a direct taking of a
protected species through hunting, shooting, or killing the animal is
relatively straightforward, the standards for an indirect taking
through “harm” to habitat are much more muddled. The Secretary of
the Interior includes the following in the definition of “harm”:
“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
29
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”
A section 9 ESA claim for fish stocking requires resolution of at
30
least two important unanswered questions about the application of a
taking based on habitat modification. First, it requires a resolution of
whether the “actual injury” prong of the harm test can be satisfied
with injury to a population instead of an identifiable individual
31
animal. Second, it requires resolution of the appropriate burden of

25. Id. app.K-3.
26. There are 16 states with little NEPAs to date. See Council on Envt.l Quality, State
Environmental Planning Information, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/NEPA/regs/states/states.cfm (last
visited Dec. 26, 2009) (listing states with environmental planning laws similar to NEPA, which
also includes the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and members of the Tahoe-Sierra
Compact).
27. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2008).
29. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008). Notably, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife has expanded their
definition of essential behavioral patterns to include “breeding, spawning, rearing, migrating,
feeding or sheltering.” 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2008).
30. Another article could be devoted to a third issue - what Professor Rasband has termed
“multiple habitat modifiers.” See James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate
Cause: Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water
Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 598 (2003). Although the Supreme
Court has indicated that application of the take provision appears to be subject to “ordinary
requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability,” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 n.9 (1995), many of the habitat modification cases
involve more than one cause. The habitat of endangered trout, for instance, is often modified
by not only fish stocking, but water diversion projects, droughts, and other human and natural
interference.
31. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008); see also S. Quarles & T. Lundquist, When Do Land Use
Activities ”Take” Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, SK056 ALI-
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proof required to establish an injury through “significant
32
impairment.”
Part I of this article provides a brief background to fish stocking
practices in the United States, including a discussion of beneficial fish
stocking practices, as well as some of the allegations surrounding the
detrimental effects. Part II of this article provides some necessary
background on section 9 of the ESA, the “actual injury” prong, the
“significant impairment” prong, and their application to fish stocking.
Part III of this article sets forth recommendations for future
clarification and increased consistency on these issues. Specifically,
this article supports the use of two rules that can help reconcile the
uncertain landscape surrounding a taking based on habitat
modification. First, “actual injury” should be found where there is
injury to either an individual or a population of protected species.
Second, the degree of proof required to establish an “injury” where
essential behaviors are impaired should be bifurcated into two tests,
depending on which behavioral pattern is being adversely affected.
Together, these rules can bring resolution not only to scenarios like
fish stocking, but also to other future fact patterns scrutinized under
the habitat modification analysis.
Part IV of this article demonstrates how application of these
rules to states can further the goals of the ESA, both through
voluntary reevaluation of fish stocking programs, and through
application for an Incidental Take Permit and corresponding Habitat
Conservation Plan. These rules can provide two different paths to the
same goal: to minimize adverse impacts to endangered and
threatened species.
I.

FISH STOCKING

For over a century in the United States, people have been
33
stocking lakes and rivers with non-native fish.
For years, this
ABA 107, 123 (agreeing that “[a]ctual injury or death of wildlife and impairing essential
behavioral patterns seem to be separate prerequisites for harm.”).
32. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008).
33. See, e.g., Lee Newman, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., The Grand Portage Project: A
Successful Model for the Reintroduction of Lake Superior Coaster Brook Trout Populations,
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/ashland/grndport.html (“Attempts have been made to restore
coaster populations in Lake Superior by stocking fingerling and yearling hatchery brook trout
on a sporadic basis for more than 100 years.”) (last visited Dec. 26, 2009); see also Pa. Fish &
Boat Commission, PA State Fish Hatcheries: Engines for Rural Economic Development,
available at http://www.fish.state.pa.us/hatchinfsm.pdf (describing a legislative act in 1873 that
established Pennsylvania’s first fish hatchery).
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seemed like the sensible thing to do. It provided anglers with ample
fishing opportunities and fisherman with ample bounty without
depleting the native fish population.
The federal government has supported fish stocking for
recreational purposes for over a hundred and thirty years. In 1871,
Congress created a National Fish Hatchery System whose original
purpose was to develop hatchery fish populations that could replace
depleted fish populations, establish fish populations for specific
management needs, and provide new and expanded recreational
34
opportunities. Over the last century, over 200 federal fish hatcheries
35
have been constructed and operated in forty-eight states. Currently,
the National Fish Hatchery System includes seventy hatcheries in
thirty-five states that produce more than sixty different species of fish,
seven Fish Technology Centers, nine Fish Health Centers, and one
36
Historical National Fish Hatchery.
Over time, the federal hatcheries have become outnumbered by
state hatcheries. For instance, the state of Washington has ten federal
hatcheries and ninety-one state hatcheries to “provide sustainable
37
fisheries and meet the state’s tribal treaty obligations.” And the
state of Oregon has two federal hatcheries compared to thirty-three
38
state hatcheries.
Fish stocking has many admirable goals, including rehabilitation
of stressed populations, mitigation of effects of water projects, and
provision of recreational opportunities for anglers. In 2008, for
example, environmentalists claimed a critical victory for one of
America’s most critically endangered species, the Rio Grande silvery
39
minnow. On December 17, 2008, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) released more than 430,000 hatchery-raised fish into former
40
habitat in the Big Bend region of west Texas. FWS “plans to release
additional fish there over the next four years to establish an
34. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 3.
35. Edwards & Nickum, supra note 14, at 42.
36. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., National Fish Hatcheries, http://www.fws.gov/fisheries/
nfhs/offices.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
37. Wash. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, Fact Sheet: The Dual Role of Washington’s
Hatcheries: Conservation of Wild Stocks, Sustainable Fisheries (2000), http://
wdfw.wa.gov/factshts/hatcheries.htm; see also U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 36.
38. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 36; Or. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, Hatchery
Information, http://www.dfw.state.or.us/fish/hatchery/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
39. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Program, Silvery Minnows Return
to Texas, http://www.fws.gov/Endangered/home_stories/silvery_minnows.html (last visited Dec.
26, 2009).
40. Id.
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experimental, self-sustaining wild population in the lower Rio
41
Grande.” And in the case of Idaho’s Dworshak Dam, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers constructed the Dworshak National Fish
Hatchery, the largest steelhead hatchery in the world, to mitigate for
42
fishery losses from the construction and operation of the dam.
But during the last decade, mounting evidence suggests that
these non-native fish are negatively impacting the native fish and
43
amphibian species.
The Congressionally established Hatchery
Scientific Review Group (HSRG) determined that in the Columbia
River Basin in the Pacific Northwest “hatchery programs – as
currently operated – were contributing to the risks those [threatened
44
or endangered salmon] were facing.” Hatchery fish are starting to
45
dominate wild fish in many locations, and scientific studies regarding
46
the harms to native fish populations are growing in abundance.
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The issue is complicated by the fact that a number of the species
affected by hatchery-released fish in the United States are protected
47
under the Endangered Species Act. There are thirty-four marine

41. Id.
42. U.S.
Army
Corps
of
Eng’rs,
Dworshak
Dam
and
Reservoir,
http://www.nww.usace.army.mil/dpn/dpn_project.asp?project_id=43 (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
43. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text; see also Murray Carpenter, On a Hunt for
Fishless Lakes, Teeming with Life, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at D2, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/science/earth/28Lake.html (focusing on the negative
impacts of stocking fish in fishless lakes in Maine).
44. HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COLUMBIA
RIVER BASIN HATCHERY REFORM 3 (2009), available at http://www.hatcheryreform.us/
hrp_downloads/reports/ columbia_river/report_to_congress/hsrg_report_12.pdf.
45. See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Northeast Fishery Center: Recent Projects of the
Population Ecology Branch, http://www.fws.gov/northeast/fisherycenter/popeco_projects.html
(last visited Dec. 26, 2009) (noting that the Northeast Fishery Center’s program of “[h]atchery
propagation and stocking of American shad represent a large component of restoration efforts
in the Susquehanna River. In a subsample of the returning adult population at Conowingo Dam
in 2003, approximately 26% of the adults were of wild origin, and 74% were of hatchery
origin.”).
46. See HELFMAN, supra note 7.
47. See, e.g., CAL. TROUT, SOS: CALIFORNIA’S NATIVE FISH CRISIS 38–39, 50–51 (2008),
available at http://www.caltrout.org/SoS-Californias-Native-Fish-Crisis.pdf (determining that the
Southern Oregon/Northern California Coho Salmon and Northern California Coast Summer
Steelhead, listed as threatened under the ESA, are both at risk from hatcheries, among other
factors); see also Pac. Rivers Council, California’s Aerial Fish Stocking Program Endangers
Native Frogs (August 1, 2001), http://www.pacificrivers.org/about/press/releases/californiasaerial-fish-stocking-program-endangers-native-frogs (noting impact of over-stocking of fish on
the endangered mountain yellow-legged frog).
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48

and anadromous fish listed as threatened or endangered. Eighteen
salamanders are listed as endangered, threatened, or candidate
species across California, Arizona, Florida, South Carolina, Georgia,
49
Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Alabama. And the Fish and
Wildlife Service has sufficient information to warrant listing for 249
50
candidate species, but for which proposed listing regulations are
51
“precluded by other higher priority listing activities.”
Promulgated in 1973, the Endangered Species Act recognizes the
52
value in preserving biodiversity. Section 9 and its regulations make
53
it unlawful for any “person” to “take” an endangered or threatened
54
species. The regulations define “take” broadly: “to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
55
attempt to engage in any such conduct.” The Supreme Court has
determined that a take need not be intentional to establish liability
56
under section 9, and that ESA liability is not limited to direct
57
applications of force against a protected species. In addition to civil
and criminal penalties, injunctive relief is available for violating
58
section 9 of the ESA.

48. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries Serv., Office of Protected Res.,
Marine/Anadromous Fish Species Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/esa/fish.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
49. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species Reports, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/
SpeciesReport.do (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
50. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species Reports, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/
SpeciesReport.do?listingType=C&mapstatus=1 (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
51. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Candidate Species: Section 4 of the Endangered Species
Act, available at http://www.fws.gov/ENDANGERED/factsheets/candidate_species.pdf.
52. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, 1531(a)(3) and (b) (2006)
(finding that the species of fish, wildlife, and plants in danger of or threatened with extinction
“are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the
Nation and its people” and that the purpose of the Act is “to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved”).
53. Although much of the analysis surrounding section 9’s “person” definition surrounds its
application to private actors, the ESA defines “person” to include “any officer, employee,
agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
54. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (protecting endangered species); id. § 1533(d) (authorizing the
Services to extend the take prohibitions of section 9 to threatened species by regulation).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006).
56. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
57. Id. at 697.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2006).
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The Secretary of the Interior explains that “harm” in the
definition of “take” in the ESA regulations “may include significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
59
including breeding, feeding or sheltering.” “[H]abitat modification
60
or degradation, standing alone, is not a taking pursuant to section 9.”
The impairment of essential behavioral patterns must be
61
accompanied by an “actual” death or injury to wildlife. In Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, the Supreme Court held that
the Secretary of Interior rightly interpreted “harm” to include habitat
modification, but left open issues about the precise application of this
62
definition to real-world scenarios. Two of these ambiguities are at
issue in this article.
A. The Problem with “Actual Injury”
The first ambiguity lies in the requirement that there be an
“actual” death or injury and the difference between injury to an
individual protected animal and injury to a population of protected
species. The confusion surrounding this issue can be conflated with
the level of proof required to establish injury. While a wounded or
dead protected animal will surely suffice, what are courts to do when
there is no proverbial “dead body” of a protected species available as
proof of harm? Prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sweet Home,
lower courts had taken a relatively broad view of “actual harm,”
rejecting arguments that “actual injury” requires: (1) evidence of
63
actual death of individual members of the protected species; or (2)
64
threatened extinction of a species. In one of the earlier decisions on
this issue, the Federal District Court of Hawaii stated:
[a] finding of “harm” does not require death to individual members
of the species; nor does it require a finding that habitat degradation
59. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008).
60. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of "Harm," 46
Fed. Reg. 54, 748 (1981).
61. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 703–4.
62. See id. at 695, 699-700. This is one limitation of facial challenges, such as the one
brought in Sweet Home.
63. See, e.g., Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land and Natural Res., 649 F.Supp. 1070, 1075 (D.
Haw.1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. See Swan View Coal., Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992). Notably,
the District Court of Hawaii resurrected the “extinction” test when it denied summary judgment
where “it is not certain that lobster plays such an essential role in the monk seal diet that a
reduction of lobster prey dooms the monk seal to extinction.” Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta,
122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1134 (D. Haw. 2000).
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is presently driving the species further toward extinction. Habitat
destruction that prevents the recovery of the species by affecting
essential behavioral patterns causes actual injury to the species and
65
effects [sic] a taking under section 9 of the Act.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not make clear whether
actual injury to the population is sufficient to satisfy this element or
whether actual injury to an individual member of a species is
required. In a footnote, however, the Court appears to reject an
interpretation of a taking that applies only to “some creature,” as
66
opposed to a “species.” The Court states that limiting a take to an
exercise of power over an animal “ill serves the statutory text, which
forbids not taking ‘some creature’ but ‘taking any [endangered]
67
species.’” And in his dissent, Justice Scalia highlights that the Final
Redefinition of “Harm” accompanying the final regulation states that
68
“harm” refers to “injury to a population.” In this regulation, the
Secretary of Interior states that “harm” is not limited to “direct
69
physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife species.”
Interpreted in this light, this regulation can be interpreted to mean
that the “actual” injury prong can be satisfied without a “dead body.”
But Justices in both the concurring and dissenting Sweet Home
opinions are reluctant, and adamantly opposed, respectively, to an
interpretation that allows harm to a population to satisfy the actual
injury requirement where habitat modification or degradation is at
issue.
Justice O’Connor explicitly indicates that, from her
perspective, “the harm regulation applies where significant habitat
modification . . . causes actual death or injury to identifiable
70
animals.” And Justice Scalia, in dissent, points to the regulation’s
inclusion of injury to populations as the “most important unlawful
71
feature of the regulation.”
His problem is that the regulation
“encompasses injury inflicted, not only upon individual animals, but
72
upon populations of the protected species.” The majority appears to

65. Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1075.
66. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697 n.10.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of "Harm," 46
Fed. Reg. 54, 748 (1981).
70. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 713 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
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agree, stating in a footnote that the dissent was incorrect to suggest
73
the regulation fails “to require injury to particular animals.”
Section 9 habitat modification cases subsequent to Sweet Home
generally have evoked the individual versus population debate in the
74
context of requests for injunctive relief. And although the Supreme
Court stated that “[section] 9 cannot be enforced until a killing or
75
injury has occurred,” that has not prevented lower courts from
granting injunctive relief even where a harm has yet to occur.
Rejecting the Supreme Court’s statements to the contrary as dictum,
the Ninth Circuit granted an injunction even where there had been no
previous injury so long as the plaintiff could demonstrate a
76
“reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species.”
Many courts have found injury to a population as sufficient
77
“actual injury.” As two scholars have noted, where injunctions are
sought against “future conduct – most commonly indirect harm
through habitat destruction – the actual focus of the judicial inquiry
shifts from injury of individual species members to conservation of
78
the entire species or species populations.” Under the “reasonably
certain” test, some courts appear to accept proof of either individual
79
deaths or injuries or a “general decline in the population.” Even the
First Circuit’s more stringent pre-Sweet Home approach appears to

73. Id. at 700 n.13.
74. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1108 (1997) (preliminary injunction granted); Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt.
Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 554 (D.V.I. 1998) (preliminary injunction denied); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 1999) (permanent injunction denied); United
States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., No. CIV. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 298707, at *6 (D. Or. Mar.
13, 2000) (permanent injunction denied); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F.
Supp. 2d 860, 868 (D. Ariz. 2003) (preliminary injunction denied); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v.
Sutherland, 2007 WL 2220256, at *17 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (preliminary injunction denied in part
and granted in part).
75. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 688.
76. Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1066 (holding that Sweet Home did not overrule the
“reasonably certain” test articulated in Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50
F.3d. 781, 784–785 (9th Cir. 1995)).
77. See id.; see also Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
Haw. 1988); Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. Haw. 1981)
(finding “actual injury” without a dead or injured individual bird, but with evidence of harm to
population).
78. Federico Cheever & Michael Balster, The Take Prohibition in Section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act: Contradictions, Ugly Ducklings, and Conservation of Species, 34
ENVTL. L. 363, 372 (2004).
79. Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (finding that plaintiffs provided no evidence
of any general decline in the population of the Tree Boa); see, e.g., Swan View Coal. v. Turner,
824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992) (relying on grizzly bear population decline).
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accept actual injury to a population as opposed to only actual injury
80
to an identifiable member of a protected species.
While other courts have not explicitly rejected proof of injury to
protected populations, the analyses have focused on actual harm to
individuals. One lower court has elaborated on the “reasonably
certain threat of imminent harm” test, requiring either a “dead body”
or proof of proximity of the “endangered or threatened animal” to
81
the challenged action to demonstrate “actual injury.”
Some courts have used an “impairment of recovery” theory,
where proof that the “habitat degradation prevents, or possibly,
82
retards, recovery of [the] species” is sufficient to issue an injunction.
One might predict that this theory would focus on injury to the
population, but in both cases using this theory, the courts focused on
83
individual harms. In rejecting the “impairment of recovery” theory,
a lower court again focused on individual harm, noting the “threat of
84
actual injury to these owls” detected in four project areas.
The same treatment can be seen where injunctions are not at
issue. In an appeal of a summary judgment determination, the Ninth
Circuit focuses on the lack of a causal connection between the
challenged actions and the one specific eagle “Ridge nest” that failed
85
to reproduce.
B.

The Problem of Determining When “Significant Impairment”
Constitutes “Injury”

The second ambiguity at issue in this article lies in the
requirement that the impairment of the essential behavioral pattern
be significant. Specifically, it is unclear how much impairment of
behavioral patterns is sufficient to constitute injury and a taking
under the habitat modification clause. “Significant” is not defined in
80. American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting cases where
there was harm to “the species.”).
81. Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 844, 880–81 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (emphasis
added) (finding that protected species in the “vicinity” is not enough where there was no
evidence of the animals “at the project site”).
82. United States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., No. CIV. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 298707, at
*15 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2000) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1513
(9th Cir. 1994)).
83. See id. at *5 (analysis focused on injury to one “owl pair”); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
23 F.3d at 1512 (finding no evidence of “deaths of members of a protected species” (emphasis
added)).
84. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Sutherland, 2007 WL 2220256, at *15–16 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
(emphasis added).
85. Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 889–890 (9th Cir. 2004).
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the ESA or regulations, but essential behavioral patterns include
three primary needs of the species: “breeding, feeding, or
86
sheltering.” As Justice O’Connor remarked, “[b]reeding, feeding,
87
and sheltering are what animals do.”
Breeding took prominence in the Sweet Home case. In her Sweet
Home concurrence, Justice O’Connor took a narrow view of
“significant,” suggesting that only “completely preventing breeding”
or making it “impossible for an animal to reproduce” would satisfy
88
the requirement of significant impairment that causes actual injury.
As one scholar deftly points out, under her analysis “merely making
89
spawning more difficult . . . would not be enough.”
Justice O’Connor proceeded, however, to identify two other
scenarios where mere “interference with breeding” can cause an
actual injury. The first is where habitat modification prevents an
animal in a “vulnerable breeding state” from fleeing or defending
90
itself.
The second is where environmental pollutants cause an
91
animal to suffer “physical complications during gestation.” Neither
of these actions suggest complete impairment is required to establish
harm.
The lack of clarity left the lower courts in some disarray. No
court has explicitly addressed what constitutes “significant”
impairment. In Marbled Murrelet, however, the Ninth Circuit found
that an increased risk of harm to breeding constituted “significant
92
impairment.” But district courts have found that making it more
difficult for a protected species to find food or shelter does not
93
constitute significant impairment.

86. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008).
87. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 710 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id. (“One need not subscribe to theories of ‘psychic harm’ . . . to recognize that to make
it impossible for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most essential physical functions and to
render that animal, and its genetic material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is actual
injury.”).
89. Rasband, supra note 30, at 609.
90. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 710 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996).
93. See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 554
(D.V.I. 1998); United States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., No. CIV. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL
298707, at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2000); Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1134
(D. Haw. 2000).
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C. Application of Section 9 to Fish Stocking
In some ways, an analysis of the impacts of fish stocking should
be simple. Many of the obstacles discussed in prior analyses,
including foreseeability, vicarious liability of state agencies, and
94
injunction of future harms, are not show-stoppers here. Yet fish
stocking is emblematic of a common factual circumstance found in
“harm via habitat degradation” cases. There is no individual “dead
body” and there is not complete impairment of an individual or
population’s essential breeding, feeding, or sheltering patterns.
1. “Actual Injury” From Fish Stocking
95
Under an interpretation of “actual injury” that allows for injury
to populations, a strong case can be made that the addition of
hatchery fish can cause “actual injury” to protected species. The
Ninth Circuit recently ruled on the appropriateness of the National
Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) decisions regarding the impacts of
96
hatchery-raised salmon on naturally spawned salmon. In doing so,
the court found that hatchery programs pose “risks to the genetic
diversity and longterm reproductive fitness of local natural steelhead
97
populations,” including: (1) “excessive mortality of natural steelhead
in fisheries targeting hatchery-origin steelhead; (2) “competition for
prey and habitat”; (3) predation by hatchery-origin fish on younger
natural fish”; (4) “genetic introgression by hatchery-origin fish
that . . . interbreed with local natural populations”; (5) “disease
transmission”; (6) “degraded water quality and quantity”; and (7)
98
“impediments to fish passage imposed by hatchery facilities.”
Scientific studies would likely be able to demonstrate similar findings,
and perhaps show a population decline where fish stocking occurs or
99
a population increase where fish stocking has been abandoned.
Nevertheless, a claim could fail if a court were to require actual
death or injury to one, identifiable protected fish or salamander. It is
unlikely that there is one identifiable fish that was injured as a result
of fish stocking. Each of the injuries alleged fails to provide the
94. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733 (2002).
95. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
96. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009).
97. Id. at 948 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 948–949 (citing National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Final Listing
Determinations for 10 Distinct Population Segments of West Coast Steelhead, 71 Fed. Reg. 834,
856 (Jan. 5, 2006)).
99. See, e.g., Ted Williams, supra note 1.
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desired “dead body.” Stocking hatchery-raised individuals into a
body of water that contains a naturally occurring protected
population of the same species may result in the dilution of the
protected population’s gene pool. Though genetic dilution does not
injure an individual of the naturally occurring population per se, it
100
can cause harm on the population level. Injecting new competitors
for food and habitat does not lend itself to capturing evidence of a
101
And it is difficult to
native fish losing out to a hatchery fish.
document whether hatchery-raised fish are out-competing naturally
occurring individuals for food, or if hatchery-raised fish are preying
on naturally occurring individuals and their young. As a result, an
Endangered Species Act claim regarding fish stocking practices is
most likely to succeed where a court is amenable to the argument that
injury to a population is sufficient for actual injury.
2. “Significant Impairment” of Essential Behavior Patterns
From Fish Stocking
102
Similarly, under an interpretation of “significant impairment”
that acknowledges partial impairment of essential behavioral
patterns, a strong case can be made that the addition of hatchery fish
can significantly impair the breeding or feeding of protected
populations. For instance, the pleadings in the CEQA fish stocking
case allege the following breeding impairment:
When hatchery trout interbreed with a wild trout population, the
addition of genes from the hatchery fish renders that population
‘genetically extinct.’ [citation omitted]. The population ceases to
exist as a true genetic component of the species and becomes an
amalgam of two different species, with an irreversibly clouded
genetic legacy, loss or distortion of local adaptations, an uncertain
ability to adapt to future conditions, and negligible ability to
contribute to the survival of the indigenous species. [citation
omitted] The Department’s staff admit that stocking has already
caused this problem: ‘Because of the hybridized condition of these

100. See HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, supra note 11, at 2 (noting the difficulties
in detecting the genetic risks to natural populations of Pacific salmon and steelhead that exist
from natural spawning of hatchery fish).
101. See HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, COLUMBIA RIVER HATCHERY REFORM
PROJECT, FINAL SYSTEM-WIDE REPORT, APPENDIX A.7: OUTPLANTING AND NET PEN
RELEASE
OF
HATCHERY-ORIGIN
FISH
3,
available
at
http://www.hatcheryreform.us/hrp_downloads/reports/columbia_river/systemwide/4_appendix_a
_7_outplanting_and_netpen_releases.pdf (“[H]atchery summer steelhead adults and their
offspring may have contributed to wild winter steelhead population declines through
competition for spawning and rearing habitats.”).
102. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
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golden trout, fish in this location, in my opinion, will not contribute
to the long-term conservation and restoration of California golden
103
trout.’ [citation omitted]

While not a complete prevention of breeding, these allegations
establish that fish stocking has disrupted the normal reproduction of
the protected species. One could argue that because the normal
reproduction of protected fish has been negatively disrupted, the
protected fish population has been injured, resulting in a taking.
Nevertheless, a claim could fail if a court were to require
complete impairment, as suggested by Justice O’Connor. Injecting
new mates into the waterbody does not completely prevent the native
fish from breeding. And injecting new competitors for food sources
does not completely impair the native fish from feeding. It merely
adds an additional stressor on an already stressed population.
Nevertheless, even though significant impairment is open to
interpretation, reducing such stressors to preserve the ability of native
104
populations to survive fits squarely within the goals of the ESA.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTUAL INJURY AND SIGNIFICANT
IMPAIRMENT
Adoption of two key recommendations can both bring
consistency to these muddied waters and bring the results closer to
105
the purposes of the ESA.
First, the “actual injury” prong of the
harm test should be satisfied where there is injury to either an
individual or a population of protected species. Second, the degree of
proof required to establish an “injury” where essential behaviors are
impaired should be bifurcated into two tests, depending on which
behavioral pattern is being adversely affected.
A. Injury to a Protected Population Should Be Sufficient to Establish
“Actual Injury”
First, the “actual injury” prong of the harm test should be
satisfied where there is injury to either an individual or a population
of protected species. This analysis accords with earlier scholars who
have argued that injury should consider both individuals and
106
populations.
As they have noted, “the words in the definition of
103. Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 18, at 7–8.
104. See Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he ESA’s primary
goal is to preserve the ability of natural populations to survive in the wild.”).
105. See, e.g., id. (identifying a primary purpose of the ESA).
106. Cheever & Balsten, supra note 78, at 363.
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take – harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
107
collect – all describe action generally done to individuals.” “Injury
108
to species and populations plays no explicit role.” Regardless, they
argue that to remain faithful to the conservation purposes of the
ESA, courts must interpret section 9 to apply to populations “to
protect species and the ecosystems upon which they depend in order
to allow species to recover to the point where they no longer require
109
protection under the Act.”
But there is another reason to extend the reach of section 9 to
injury to populations. Common sense demands it. Limiting “actual
harm” to individual animals would result in a world where a person is
liable under section 9 for wounding one wolf in the ear (a minimal
injury with little long-term harm to the species), but would have free
reign to adversely modify the habitat of the entire population of
wolves so long as no single wolf exhibits signs of injury (a more
damaging action with long-term harm to the species).
This approach is further supported by the lack of alternative
110
mechanisms in the law to prevent a non-federal activity that will
impair the essential behavioral functions of a population of
endangered species. The two most likely alternatives both have
significant limitations. The first, to purchase the habitat under section
111
5 of the ESA is dependent on adequate funding. The second, to
designate the land as critical habitat, would suffer from substantial
delay. The federal wildlife agencies have proved to be overwhelmed
112
administratively with the critical habitat decisions. As of December
1, 2005, only 471 of the 1272 listed species have had their requisite
critical habitat designation and the FWS has indicated that this is a
113
“low priority” in light of the backlog of species listing decisions.

107. Id. at 369.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 396.
110. Section 7 of the ESA, which requires consultation for these population-level effects,
fails to hold non-federal actors accountable for activities that jeopardize the existence of a listed
species unless there was federal approval of the private activity. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
111. Section 5 of the ESA authorizes the Secretary to “acquire by purchase, donation, or
otherwise, lands, waters, or interest therein, and such authority shall be in addition to any other
land acquisition vested in him.” 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2) (2006).
112. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Critical Habitat, What is it?, available at
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/listing/Critical_Habitat_12_05.pdf.
113. Id.
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B. Significant Impairment of Breeding Should be Sufficient Proof to
Establish Injury
Second, the degree of proof required to establish an “injury”
where essential behaviors are significantly impaired should be
bifurcated into two tests, depending on which behavioral pattern is
being adversely affected.
Specifically, courts should apply a
presumption of “actual injury” where the breeding of a protected
individual or population is significantly impaired, even where there is
less than complete impairment of reproduction. Alternatively, where
the feeding or sheltering of a protected individual or population is
significantly impaired, the courts can apply a stricter level of proof of
114
injury.
Of the three behavioral patterns identified by the Secretary of
the Interior, impairment of breeding is arguably the most devastating
115
to protected species.
Where a protected species’ reproduction is
disrupted, an entire generation of a species is lost. Furthermore, of
the three behavioral patterns, impairment of breeding hits at the root
of endangered species protection. Protecting the reproductive
function of a species is the primary means to ensure the propagation
and/or recovery of a species. An animal that is well-fed with a home
does little to serve the goals of the ESA if it is unable or hindered in
its ability to reproduce.
Even the common definition of “impair” suggests that Justice
O’Connor’s interpretation of impairment of breeding is too narrow.
“Impair” is defined as “to damage or make worse by or as if by
116
diminishing in some material respect.”
Read literally, the
regulation therefore requires only that the action significantly worsen
breeding, not that the action significantly prevent breeding.
Furthermore, one of the primary arguments against allowing a
significant impairment of a behavioral pattern to constitute injury on

114. The test for feeding and sheltering should still fall short of the narrow “complete
impairment” test suggested by Justice O’Connor. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Greater Or. 515 U.S. 687, 710 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Perhaps a “near
complete impairment” test could address the efforts of prior courts to focus on whether the
disrupted food source or habitat was “essential” to the species. See e.g., Greenpeace Found. v.
Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133 (D. Haw. 2000).
115. See, e.g., Michael A. Palladino, Male Reproductive Function, http://
www.biologyreference.com/La-Ma/Male-Reproductive-System.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009)
(“Reproduction is essential for any species to sustain its population. In the simplest sense, the
most important function of every living organism is reproduction.”).
116. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, IMPAIR, available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/impairment.
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its own is the ability of animals to adapt. Even if the likelihood of
harm has been increased by a plaintiff’s actions, there is no guarantee
of harm. The animals may adapt to a plaintiff’s actions in a manner
that results in no harm to the individuals or the populations.
This argument is plausible when applied to habitat modification
of feeding or sheltering behavior. Nature has repeatedly proven that
it is more resilient than we give it credit for. In some cases, it may be
just as likely that the animals will be able to find alternative sources
of food or move to alternative sources of shelter.
Whereas impairment of feeding and sheltering may not
necessarily cause injury to a protected species because they can adapt
and find alternative food (depending on availability) and alternative
shelter (depending on their mobility), impairment of a breeding
and/or natural reproduction rises to a different level because of the
enhanced difficulties in adapting to reproductive disruptions.
Although one could imagine some nest or den destructions where the
animal may be able to relocate to alternative breeding grounds, many
of the breeding impairments do not make themselves amenable to
118
adaptation.
119
Implicitly, the courts appear to agree with this distinction. The
only cases where courts have found harm based on habitat
120
modification are where impairment of breeding was at issue. Where
117. See, e.g., Steven G. Davison, The Aftermath of Sweet Home Chapter: Modification of
Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking in Violation of the Endangered Species Act, 27 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 541, 578• 79 (2003) (noting adaptations available from
impairment of feeding, breeding, and sheltering).
118. The courts could allow this presumption to be rebutted by evidence that a specific
animal was able to reproduce despite the disruptive activity, as suggested by Professor Davison.
Id.
119. See also Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S., 296 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting
without analysis or any discussion of attendant injury that “deforestation of breeding habitat
constitutes harm under the statute.”).
120. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (“Thus, under Sweet Home, a habitat modification which significantly
impairs the breeding and sheltering of a protected species amounts to ‘harm’ under the ESA.”);
Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d. 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1995) (“FCC
proffered evidence to show that Rosboro's planned timber harvest is reasonably certain to
injure the Swartz Creek owl pair by significantly impairing their . . . breeding”); Swan View
Coal. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 936 (D. Mont. 1992) (plaintiffs allege injury to “grizzly bears
and gray wolves by significantly impairing their . . . breeding”); Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land and
Natural Res., 649 F.Supp. 1070, 1080 (D. Haw. 1986) (“The mouflon are having a significant
negative impact on the mamane forest, on which the Palila is wholly dependent for breeding”).
This is not to say that plaintiffs succeed every time impairment of breeding is alleged. Where
the courts have rejected these allegations, the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient proof that the
protected animals were present in the affected area, Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Sutherland, 2007
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only impairment of feeding or sheltering was at issue, the courts have
121
And at least one
rejected section 9 habitat modification claims.
court has found injury from breeding impairment where the action
caused genetic problems in subsequent woodpecker generations,
similar to that alleged in native fish populations stocked with hatchery
122
fish.
Therefore, although a court may require complete impairment of
feeding or sheltering to be significant, a less stringent standard should
be applied to actions that impair the reproductive function of a
protected species. The standard to be applied should recognize that
hindering or slowing reproduction of an individual or a population of
protected species creates a presumption of “injury” under the harm
123
provision.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO SECTION 9 LIABILITY
Application of these rules is likely to broaden the reach of
takings based on habitat modification from fish stocking. This added
pressure on states may serve to further the goals of the ESA, both
through voluntary reevaluation of fish stocking programs, and
through application for Incidental Take Permits and corresponding
124
Habitat Conservation Plans. Both of these paths would contribute
to the same goal: to minimize adverse impacts to endangered and
threatened species.

WL 2220256, at *15 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (plaintiff presented no evidence the owls occupy 218 of
the sites at issue); that the breeding impacts were caused by the challenged action, Cold
Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2004); or that the breeding was actually
negatively impaired by the actions, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d
860, 880 (D. Ariz. 2003) (determining that eagle nesting productivity is affected by density of
competing eagle nests, not reservoir levels); W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., No. CIV. 96-1575-HO,
2000 WL 298707, at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2000) (“[T]he owls maintain relatively high reproductive
rates.”).
121. See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 554
(D.V.I. 1998) (rejecting habitat modification claim because there was no evidence that Tree
Boas had died or been injured as a result of changes in their feeding and sheltering patterns); W.
Coast Forest Resources, 2000 WL 298707, at *5 (rejecting habitat modification where ample
food sources existed); Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1132 (D. Haw. 2000)
(rejecting habitat modification where ample food sources existed).
122. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp 1260, 1272 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d in part and vacated
in part, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Isolation also causes the gene pool to be reduced with
fewer birds in a given area, causing genetic problems and abnormalities in the subsequent
generations.”); see also Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 103.
123. This approach differs from prior interpretations suggested by Quarles & Lundquist,
supra note 31 (arguing that “reducing breeding success rate at the population level is not take”).
124. See infra sections A and B.
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A. Voluntary Reevaluation of Fish Stocking to Minimize Impacts to
Endangered or Threatened Species
States that suspect their actions may trigger section 9 liability can
find themselves encouraged to perform a voluntary reevaluation of
their fish stocking policies. Such self-assessments are not a new idea.
In accordance with a policy committing NMFS and FWS to identify,
to the extent possible, those activities that would or would not violate
section 9 of the ESA with respect to West Coast Salmon, NMFS
included “[r]eleasing non-indigenous or artificially propagated species
into a listed species’ habitat or where they may access the habitat of
125
listed species.”
The rule provides that “[p]ersons or entities
concluding that their activity is likely to injure or kill protected fish
are encouraged to immediately adjust that activity to avoid take (or
adequately limit any impacts on the species) and seek NMFS’
authorization for incidental take under: (a) an ESA section 10
incidental take permit; (b) an ESA section 7 consultation; or (c) a
126
limit on the take prohibitions provided in this proposed rule.”
More recently, in February 2009, the Congressionally-established
Hatchery Scientific Review group (HSRG) determined that both
harvest and hatchery reforms are needed to help salmon and
127
steelhead in the Pacific Northwest.
Taking the lead in this
endeavor, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA)’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has launched
the review of over 100 federally funded salmon and steelhead
hatchery programs in the Columbia River basin to assure they do not
128
NOAA will be
hinder efforts to recover protected fish species.
developing biological opinions to assess whether the federal actions
jeopardize the survival of the thirteen “evolutionarily listed units” or
129
“designated population segments” in the Columbia River basin.
The potential for ESA liability may encourage more of such

125. Endangered and Threatened Species; Proposed Rule Governing Take of Four
Threatened Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs) of West Coast Salmonids: California
Central Valley Spring-run Chinook; California Coastal Chinook; Northern California Steelhead;
Central California Coast Coho, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,150• 54 (August 17, 2001) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 223).
126. Id.
127. HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, supra note 44.
128. NOAA to Launch ESA Review of 100 Federally Funded Basin Hatchery Projects,
COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.fishbio.com/home/16-news/269-noaa-tolaunch-esa-review-of-100-federally-funded-basin-hatchery-programs.html.
129. Id.
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beneficial assessments and result in scientifically appropriate
adjustments to fish stocking without the inefficiencies of litigation.
B. Incidental Take Permits
As alluded to above, states can also seek to immunize their fish
stocking practices from ESA liability with an Incidental Take Permit
(ITP). Section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA allows people who determine
that their “otherwise lawful activity” will result in the incidental
130
taking of a protected species to apply for an ITP from FWS.
Receipt of an ITP immunizes the person from liability under the
131
ESA. FWS uses five criteria to determine whether to issue the ITP:
(1) the taking will be incidental; (2) the applicant will, to the
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of
such taking; (3) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for
the plan will be provided; (4) the taking will not appreciably reduce
the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild;
and (5) the measures, if any, required under [16 U.S.C. §
1539(a)(2)(A)(iv) ] will be met; [and][the Service] has received such
other assurances as [it] may require that the [habitat conservation
132
plan] will be implemented[.]
As a prerequisite to receiving an ITP, the applicant must submit
a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) that specifies “(i) the impact
which will likely result from such taking; (ii) what steps the applicant
will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the funding that
will be available to implement such steps; (iii) what alternative
actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why
such alternatives are not being utilized; and (iv) such other measures
that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate for
133
purposes of the plan.”
As one scholar has noted, rather than serve to eliminate all
actions that would harm species, “section 9 functions as a sorting
mechanism to identify those activities that require an incidental take
134
permit before they may proceed.” This “serves as a mechanism to
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006).
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2) (2006).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2) (2008); id. § 17.32(b)(2)
(2008).
133. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A). The federal agency’s approval of this ITP constitutes a
federal action that triggers section 7 consultation obligations for the federal agency. See Animal
Protection Inst. v. Holsten, 541 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1076 (D. Minn. 2008).
134. Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in
the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 691 (2008).
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135

force dischargers to the negotiating table to acquire permits.”
In
the case of fish stocking, the creation of HCPs would allow the states
to determine which waterbodies are home to endangered species,
identify those species being injured by fish stocking, and selectively
adapt the fish stocking programs in a way that maintains the
beneficial effects of fish stocking in some areas while minimizing the
harm to protected species.
V. CONCLUSION
The political ramifications of reevaluating fish stocking are not to
be underestimated. As indicated by the opening line of this article,
the fate of fish stocking often pits fishermen against environmentalists
and conservation biologists. Fishing is an integral part of the culture
of many Americans, as well as the economies of many states.
Employment opportunities are dependent on state hatcheries, and
“increased enthusiasm for fishing directly affects the state’s sales of
136
sport-fishing licenses.”
Conversely, “[w]hen the state’s ability to
stock lakes and rivers with fish dwindles, so does the ability to sell
137
fishing licenses.”
Although it is difficult to change the status quo with respect to a
century of fish stocking, particularly one so engrained with political
consequences, the state wildlife agencies outside of California may
want to heed the warning sent by the California Superior Court and
take advantage of the opportunity to reevaluate their fish stocking
programs to assess the impact on endangered and threatened species.
Piecemeal policies forced by court order without a comprehensive
and coordinated approach could lead to inconsistent and inefficient
efforts. By being proactive in response to potential ESA litigation,
the agencies may be able to take the time to make reasoned
adjustments to their fish stocking practices that balance the needs of
its wildlife with the desires of its constituents.

135. Id.
136. Nicholas Johnson, Fewer hatcheries means less jobs for Huxley grads, WESTERN FRONT,
Mar. 10, 2009, available at http://westernfrontonline.net/2009031010797/news/fewer-hatcheriesmeans-less-jobs-for-huxley-grads/.
137. Id.

